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Abstract
Purpose – This paper addresses the labour market impacts of Covid-19, the necessity of active labour policy
reform in response to this pandemic unemployment crisis and what trajectory this reform is likely to take as
countries shift attention from emergency income supports to stimulating employment recovery.
Design/methodology/approach – The study draws on Ireland’s experience, as an illustrative case. This is
motivated by the scale of Covid-related unemployment in Ireland, which is partly a function of strict lockdown
measures but also the policy choices made in relation to the architecture of income supports. Also, Ireland was
one of the countriesmost impacted by the Great Recession leading it to introduce sweeping reforms of its active
labour policy architecture.
Findings –The analysis shows that the Covid unemployment crisis has far exceeded that of the last financial
and banking crisis in Ireland. Moreover, Covid has also exposed the fragility of Ireland’s recovery from the
Great Recession and the fault-lines of poor public services, which intensify precarity in the context of low-paid
employment growth precipitated by workfare policies implemented since 2010. While these policies had some
short-term success in reducing the numbers on the Live Register, many cohorts were left behind by the reforms
and these employment gains have now been almost entirely eroded.
Originality/value – The lessons from Ireland’s experience of post-crisis activation reform speak to the
challenges countries now face in adapting their welfare systems to facilitate a post-Covid recovery, and the
risks of returning to “workfare” as usual.
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Introduction
Covid-19 represents far more than a public health emergency. The lockdowns that have
ensued have precipitated major recession and unprecedented levels of unemployment.
Discussion of the impacts on welfare states has thus far largely focused on social protection,
and the income supports that have been established to mitigate the financial hardship of
lockdown. Welfare states have implemented major adjustments to balance between what
Brodkin and Larsen (2013, p. 60) characterize as the “regulatory, compensatory, and
enabling” dimensions of welfare. Welfare’s regulatory dimension encompasses the
behavioural conditions attached to receiving payments, which in turn function as
“compensatory” mechanisms for reducing the impact of market-derived inequalities.
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training programmes that support “individuals to participate in the labour market on more
favourable terms than themarket alonewould allow” (Brodkin and Larsen, 2013, p. 60).When
the accent of welfare provision is on behavioural conditionality for residual payments,
welfare systems function as regimes for commodifying labour and obligating citizens to
work. This has been an unfolding trend across OECD countries for over 30 years (Greer,
2016), but particularly since the financial crisis.
As Theodore argues, once the initial shock of financial collapse subsided, the Great
Recession quickly became “a crisis that would not be wasted” (2019, p. 4). Many countries
responded to the twin challenges of high unemployment and growing fiscal deficits by
recalibrating their welfare systems around a “workfare” activation model; an approach that
“diagnoses the problem as too much reliance on welfare, emphasizes individual
responsibility, and identifies the solution as sanctions applied to the failure to find, or
prepare oneself for, paidwork” (Evans, 2007, p. 31). This behavioural turnwas conjoinedwith
regressive cuts to social spending and was most pronounced in Britain, where the crisis was
followed by sweeping changes to eligibility conditions that sharpened an already “systemic
trend towards liberal paternalism” (Edmiston, 2017, p. 263). Universal credit extended
conditionality to working claimants and their partners, and sanctions were toughened to
allow the withdrawal of benefits for up to three years (Wright and Dwyer, 2014).
Even European countries with purportedly more “enabling” models oriented by human
capital development used the crisis to reconfigure their systems towards “promoting the
demanding elements of activation” (Seikel and Spannagel, 2018, p. 247). In an early analysis of
the shifting reform trajectory in Europe, Brodkin and Larsen observed “emerging tendencies
towardmore of aUS styleworkfare approach” (2013, p. 63), with Umney et al. interpreting this
as “a by-product of austerity” in that training schemes to combat social exclusion are more
expensive than job-search assistance targeted at the job ready while “sanctions reduce
benefits payments” (2018, p. 345). For example, the Sarkozy government reformed France’s
minimum income system in 2009 to incorporate stronger job-search conditionality and a
tighter focus on work-first activation. Likewise, Germany introduced cuts to unemployment
benefits and services under the 2012 federal budget although it had already moved towards
workfare under the 2005 Hartz IV reforms, which tightened eligibility criteria for
unemployment assistance and linked payments to job-search conditionality (Lødemel and
Gubrium, 2014). Elsewhere, in Denmark and the Netherlands, the pursuit of “flexicurity”
polices stalled as the trajectory of reform became “driven more by austerity and “work-first”
demands” (Bekker and Mailand, 2019, p. 153).
Covid has temporarily arrested this workfarist orientation of welfare policies. Over March
and April, job-search conditionality requirements and sanctions for non-compliance were
lifted in several countries including France, Germany and Sweden (OECD, 2020c). The
activation regimes of liberal welfare states were particularly impacted. Regulatory demands
inherent in those countries’ social security systems were all but suspended, while
compensatory benefits were increased in value and coverage. In Australia, the
introduction of a coronavirus supplement of AUD$550 per fortnight doubled the amount
received by recipients of unemployment benefits overnight, while the country’s “mutual
obligations” regime was suspended until August (Remeikis, 2020). In the UK, work-
conditionality requirements were suspended for three months, and out-of-work payments
were modestly increased by £20 per week; a removal of conditionality “extraordinary in
political and policy terms” (Edmiston et al., 2020). Ireland took the unusual step of introducing
a new emergency Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP), reserved for those who became
unemployed on, or after, 13 March 2020. The individualized basic income payment of V350
per week can be compared to emergency payment schemes introduced in other liberal welfare
regimes, such as Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation in the United States and




7.3 million Canadians where, like PUP, eligibility was ex-post (Beauchamp, 2020). At the
height of lockdown in late April and earlyMay, almost 600,000 people were receiving the PUP
costing V206 million per week (DEASP, 2020a).
As economies reopen, the focus of welfare recalibration will necessarily shift from
cushioning the financial impacts of job displacement to adapting activation policies to
stimulate labour market re-entry. In this article, we highlight the emerging pandemic
unemployment crisis and consider the trajectory that post-Covid activation reformmay take.
Our analysis focuses on the Irish welfare state as an illustrative case while situating Irish
developments within the wider international context to provide broader insights about
activation reform in recessionary times.
Ireland is an interesting case for several reasons. Post-Brexit, Ireland will be the only EU
Anglophone, or liberal welfare state. Historically a relatively hybrid model, Ireland is an
informative place fromwhich to observewelfare trajectories andmay be particularly relevant
for other small open European economies, particularly those in the Eurozone. The degree to
which Ireland was one of the hardest hit by the 2008 financial crisis, and subsequently
became the poster child of recovery, highlights its relevance for examining how the previous
crisis and consequent policy directions impacted on its capacity to copewith the pandemic. In
particular, Ireland’s perceived strong recovery from the last crisis makes it an interesting
case, in particular the role that rapid transformation of its welfare institutions played in
coping with a surge in long-term unemployment, embracing both “workfare” activation and
social services marketisation at a speed rarely seen in other countries (Dukelow and Kennett,
2018; Murphy, 2016), offers an important point for reflection. However, as we argue, the
Covid-crisis has exposed underlying fault-lines of Ireland’s “low road” recovery model in
relation to labour market insecurity and weak investment in public services.
While Ireland does not feature widely in discussions of the comparative public health
impacts of Covid-19, the Irish labour market has been very severely affected by the Covid-
crisis due to a combination of strict lockdown measures, it’s policy choices concerning
emergency income supports, as well as structural features of Ireland’s open, service-oriented
economy. The particular Irish architecture, which relies more on income supports than public
services to enable people to “stay home to save lives”, offers a specific opportunity to
understand how and why underlying fault-lines in a country’s welfare state can prompt new
departures in welfare policy which may or may not create their own path dependencies.
Covid-19 is a recent phenomenon, and constantly changing policy responses translate into
significant data tracking challenges. This article therefore utilises a different methodological
approach than a classic research methodology. Rather than reporting primary research
findings, it reviews academic and grey literature along with available secondary quantitative
data, with Ireland as the context and Covid-19 as the object of interest. By providing a
synthesis of the available information and current research and reasoning in relation to
concepts and theories of active labour policy reform, our analysis sheds light on the potential
trajectories as well as likely societal impacts of further workfare-oriented social policy
responses to recession, not just for Ireland but more generally in a European and wider
context.
We proceed by documenting the labour market impacts of the Covid-crisis, before
reviewing how activation policies were reoriented in response to the last unemployment
crisis, the Great Recession, when a climate of fiscal austerity reduced already poor public
services and a steep rise in unemployment was the context that facilitated an institutional
reconfiguration of Ireland’s welfare state. Although these activation reforms had some short-
term success in reducing overall claimant numbers, they did so at the expense of intensifying
the dynamic of low-paid work and aggravating broader socio-economic inequalities with the
result that many cohorts of citizens were left behind by the reforms.We argue that the Covid-




Ireland’s reconfigured welfare state architecture in the face of major economic downturn. A
key concern in the context of any post-Covid recovery iswhether vulnerable groupswhowere
left behind by workfare reforms following the Great Recession will be re-forgotten, as the
focus shifts to dismantling the “‘protective’ capacity of the welfare state” (Dukelow and
Kennett, 2018, p. 497).
The Covid unemployment crisis
The Covid-related unemployment crisis has been sharp and fast. Even countries with milder
outbreaks, such as Australia, experienced mass employment disruption with the number of
people receiving job-seeking payments doubling to 1.6 million Australians between
December 2019 and April 2020 (Hutchens, 2020). In the UK, one of the countries most
impacted by Covid, the lockdown measures precipitated an economic shock “unprecedented
in modern history in its size and speed” (Wilson et al., 2020, p. 7). By early April, the
unemployment rate had risen to 7.5% and, despite the 8.5 million workers on furlough (see
below), was still higher already than the peak levels reached during the Great Recession
(Wilson et al., 2020). Across Europe, a spring economic forecast estimated that the Covid-
crisis was already the deepest recession in EU history. Impacts were asymmetric across
member states, with 2020 unemployment levels forecast to vary from below 6% in several
countries (Netherlands, Germany, Australia, Denmark) to above 18% in Spain and Greece
(European Commission, 2020).
However, unemployment figures reveal only a fraction of the employment disruption
wrought by the pandemic. Partly, this is because, due to the shuttering of economies, vast
proportions of displaced workers are not actively job-searching but waiting to return to jobs
that may or may not resume. As such, they do not meet the technical definition of
unemployment, which requires people to be available for work and to have job-searched
within the previous four weeks. Another reason why unemployment data conceal the impact
of Covid on labour markets relates to the hundreds of thousands who have remained on
payrolls through short-time work (or furlough) schemes, such as Germany’s Kurzarbeit
scheme which was expanded to cover temporary and agency workers, and to fund 100% of
employees’ social insurance contributions comparedwith 50%before the pandemic. Italy and
France similarly extended their short-term working schemes to all workers, along with
limiting economic dismissals to encourage companies to avoid laying off workers (OECD,
2020b). The UK created an entirely new short-time work scheme, the Job Retention Scheme,
which covered 80% of the wages of employees’ (up to £2,500/month) whose work was
disrupted by lockdown measures. By late May, about 8.7 million workers had been
furloughed under the scheme (ONS, 2020): more than two-and-a-half times the number of new
Universal Credit claims (3.2 million) made between mid-March and June (Edmiston et al.,
2020). This ensured that the rise in unemployment was more modest than in some other
countries’, although Mayhew and Anand (2020, p. 2) also caution that the JRS has merely
delayed a steep rise in unemployment until subsidies are unwound later in 2020. In Ireland,
the use of furlough schemes has been more modest, and new claimants have, from the start,
been factored into a “Covid-adjusted” unemployment rate, providing a more realistic
assessment of the employment impacts of the pandemic.
Ireland’s pandemic unemployment crisis
Ireland introduced one of the strictest lockdowns in Europe (Hale et al., 2020). On 12 March,
just one day after the first confirmed Covid-death, all childcare and educational institutions
were closed, followed by pubs on 15 March and all other non-essential businesses on 27




begin to re-open. Further lockdown measures were eased on 8 June, although it was not until
29 June that most economic sectors were permitted to reopen and citizens could travel beyond
county borders. Although resurgence of the virus over the summer of 2020meant that the full
economy never reopened and regional lock downs became a feature of “living with the virus”.
The conservative pace of re-opening was partly driven by the Government’s adoption of a
two-metre distancing rule, in comparison to other countries opting for a one-and-a-half
(Germany, Italy) or one-metre (France, Denmark) rule. This hindered the re-opening of service
sectors, along with educational institutions, and the government has come under increasing
pressure to resist the National Public Health Emergency Team’s (NPHET) social distancing
advice. The advisory body has exerted enormous influence over Ireland’s Covid response. It
has been accused of “running the country” during the early stages of the pandemic, when a
slow government formation process (20 February to 26 June) precipitated a caretaker
government and weak cabinet that was perceived as unwilling to act contrary to NPHET’s
advice (O’Connel and Sheehan, 2020).
Beyond the austerity of its lockdown, Ireland also experienced a severe rise in
unemployment from 5% in early March to a “Covid-19 adjusted” unemployment rate of
28.2% by late April, dropping to 16.7% in July (CSO, 2020a, 2020b). This figure includes both
officially unemployed workers and those displaced onto the PUP, who may not be actively
job-searching. This unusual method of reporting unemployment figures gives Ireland a more
accurate indication of the level of job displacement wrought by Covid.
As elsewhere, the impacts of lockdown measures have been “markedly asymmetric”
across various groups of workers. More generally across Europe, Perez et al. (2020) observe
that key economic sectors, such as hospitality and personal services, that were closed during
the early stages of the pandemic were often “characterised by low wages and precarious
conditions of employment”with high concentrations of women and youngworkers. Ireland is
no exception, with an early analysis finding that those who were laid-off were “more likely to
be young, low-skilled, female and part-time than the population average” (Coates et al., 2020,
p. 33). The downturn has been particularly sharply felt by younger and low-paid workers,
with unemployment among those under 25 rising to a Covid-adjusted unemployment rate of
62% in May 2020, dropping to 41% in July 2020 (CSO, 2020b). More than a fifth of PUP
claimants came from Accommodation and Food Services which, along with the Wholesale
and Retail Trade and Construction sectors, accounted for approximately half of PUP
recipients (Coates et al., 2020). These are all also among the four lowest paid sectors in the
Irish economy. By late April, more than a quarter of Wholesale and Retail workers, almost
half of Construction workers and two-thirds of Accommodation and Food Services workers
had lost their jobs (Coates et al., 2020). By earlyMay, over 1.26million Irishworkers were fully
or partially dependent onwelfare, including: almost 215,000 people on the Live Register, more
than 450,000 furloughed under the Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme and almost 590,000
receiving the PUP (DEASP, 2020a). In addition, it is estimated that a further 565,000 people of
working-age were receiving other state income supports such as Disability and Carers
payments, taking the number of working-age people reliant in income support to almost
1.8 million out of a total working-age population of just under four million and a labour force
of 2.47 million (Murphy et al., 2020; CSO, 2020c).
Why Ireland’s unemployment crisis was so deep?
Several factors explain why pandemic unemployment reached such a high level in Ireland.
One reason is the severity of lockdown measures and slow pace of re-opening. This can be
partially attributed to a political vacuum and the degree to which underdeveloped public
services, a feature of Ireland’s welfare architecture, afforded limited room to manoeuvre to
accommodate social distancing requirements (e.g. small classroom sizes, high student–




global market volatility, fluctuations in international trade and “boom-and-bust” cycles.
Another feature of the Irish economy is the size of its services sector, meaning that a high
proportion of workers were vulnerable to being shuttered. According to an early study by
Fana et al. (2020), just under 13% of Irish employees were employed in sectors that were
almost entirely closed and unable to operate via teleworking, such as hospitality, real estate
services, leisure and recreation services. This comparedwith an average of below 10%across
EU countries.
The policy choices made in relation to income supports may have also contributed to the
rise in unemployment. Where furlough payments were widely used to retain workers in jobs
by other countries, Ireland prioritised the establishment of a quasi-basic income scheme, the
PUP. Unlike conventional income supports, the PUP was not means-tested and offered a
generous income replacement rate of V350 per week (LMAC, 2020). Controversially, people
who were claiming social assistance payments prior to 13 March remained on Jobseekers’
Allowance (JA), receiving a householdmeans-tested payment rate for a single person of either
V203 per week, or just V112.50 per week for those under 25.
The PUP was not introduced in isolation, however. Like other countries, Ireland
implemented a TemporaryWage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS) in lateMarch. However, unlike the
PUP’s administrative simplicity, it was complex in design. Initially, the scheme subsidised up
to 70% of net wages up to V410 per week. However, a lower subsidy of V350 per week was
paid to employees with net earnings above V586 per week, while those with net earnings
above V960 per week were ineligible. Consequently, in its early design, a significant
proportion of displaced workers were either no better off or perhaps even worse off on the
TWSS than they would’ve been on the PUP (Beirne et al., 2020). In May, a series of changes
were introduced to increase the range of workers eligible for the TWSS, although the number
of PUP recipients continued to eclipse the number of workers supported through the TWSS
until early June (DEASP, 2020c).
As Ireland’s economy has begun reopening, issues around the PUP payment rate and
disincentives to work have come to the fore. One early analysis found that the PUP was 50%
higher than the average gross weekly earnings of minimum wage earners in the retail,
accommodation and food work sectors (Redmond, 2020). Accordingly, in June, the PUP was
converted into a two-tiered payment whereby those with pre-Covid earnings belowV200 per
week would receive payments equivalent to the JA, while all remaining claimants would
receive V350 per week. Further changes were announced under the Government’s July
Stimulus package, which extended the PUP until April 2021 but introduced further tapering
measures from mid-September when the payment will be closed to new entrants (DEASP,
2020b). By April 2021, the government intends to have tapered the PUP back to JA rates,
although the full mechanisms to do this are not entirely clear.
The extension of the PUP suggests policy officials believe the disruption to employment
wrought by Covid-19 will remain “large-scale and long-term” (LMAC, 2020, p. 12). Following
the Great Recession, it took more than a decade for the unemployment rate to recover to pre-
crisis levels. The proportion of workers displaced by Covid is much higher this time and, as
the OECD warns, the “legacies” of Ireland’s experience of the last financial crisis, including
weak bank profitability and high household and general government debt, are likely to
“temper the speed of recovery” fromOCED (2020a, p. 235). Ireland’s LabourMarket Advisory
Council has cautioned that any reorientation of active labour programmes “will be very
challenging” given the scale of increased demand and “potential increase in the numbers of
workers who will remain unemployed” (2020, p. 22). To meet this increased demand, the
government committed an additional V100m to activation measures under its July stimulus
package, with the bulk of this investment going towards enhancing the capacity of the Public
Employment Service and contracted providers to deliver job-search assistance (DEASP,




legacy of how Ireland reformed its welfare system after the last unemployment crisis to
embed a focus on workfarist activation. An outstanding concern in the context of any post-
Covid recovery is what will happen to the labour market re-integration of the long-term
unemployed and other disadvantaged social groups who are so frequently left behind by the
“low road” nature of active labour policy responses to recession.
Active labour policies in recession: Ireland’s “workfarist” turn
In Ireland, the Great Recession brought about a fundamental shift in the institutional
rationality of the welfare state towards labour (re)commodification (Boland and Griffin, 2015;
Dukelow and Considine, 2014; Murphy, 2016). Before then, Ireland was considered “an
outlier” (Millar and Crosse, 2018, p. 114) among OECD countries in activation terms. Its
welfare system was largely “passive” in orientation. The only “active” labour measures were
optional training and work-experience programmes, and FAS, the national labour exchange.
These were highly fragmented and siloed from benefits administration. Conditionality was
weakly applied, and claimants could generally receive benefits without any requirement to
participate in re-employment services (Martin, 2015). However, the combination of a threefold
increase in unemployment, collapse in state revenues and gaining policy influence of the
Troika (EU, ECB and IMF) provided a policy window for a programme “of rapid
‘modernistation’” (Dukelow and Considine, 2014).
As elsewhere, the financial crisis was reinterpreted as a fiscal and debt crisis to legitimate
“austerity and the rapid transformation of the welfare system” (Boland and Griffin, 2015,
p. 35). Cuts to working age payments were introduced under the 2010 and 2011 Budgets. The
number of qualifying contributions required for social insurance payments was also doubled
and the duration of entitlement “significantly curtailed” (Dukelow and Considine, 2014, p. 63).
At the same time, the rate of social insurance contributions paid by employers for workers
earning less than V376 per week was halved, from 8.5% to 4.25%, as part of a new Jobs
Initiative (O’Sullivan et al., 2017). These changes were accompanied by new “penalty rates”
(amounting to 25% of total payments and payment suspensions for up to nine weeks) for
claimants who failed to comply with conditionality requirements outlined in a new Pathways
to Work activation strategy. Claimants became obligated to meet with caseworkers for
regular job-search assistance, and to sign a “personal progression plan” outlining how they
would enhance their employability. These policy changes were accompanied by significant
operational and administrative reforms of public employment services. Beginning in 2012,
the national employment service was merged with social welfare offices to consolidate
income supports and activation measures into a single Intreo service. The use of contracted
agencies to provide employment services was also greatly expanded through the
commissioning of JobPath in 2015, a Payment-by-Results quasi-market in employment
services for long-term claimants. While unemployed claimants were the primary targets of
activation, lone parents also became targeted through changes to the eligibility conditions for
the One Parent Family Payment (OPFP). The qualifying age of lone parents’ youngest child
was progressively reduced from 22 to 7 years of age, resulting in tens of thousands of lone
parents being migrated onto jobseeking payments (Millar and Crosse, 2018).
The overall demandingness of activation remains light in Ireland, although there has been
a discernible shift towards a more punitive approach. In 2017, 16,450 sanctions were applied
to claimants compared with about 1,500 in 2012 and despite a substantial decline in claimant
numbers during this period (Cousins, 2019).Meanwhile, cuts to other service areas as part of a
wider programme of austerity have also intensified pressures on lone parents and other
claimants to work through a process of what Dukelow and Kennett (2018) describe as
“coercive commodification”. Most notably, public investment in social housing fell by 94%




primary site of social housing provision through the Housing Assistance Payment and
Rebuilding Ireland strategy. This has had knock-on effects on the private rental market,
excluding many poorer households due to a “[l]ack of overall supply and private sector rent
increases” (Murphy, 2020, p. 257).
Activation – for whom?
Ireland’s reorientation of activation policy was propelled by a surge in the number of
claimants on the Live Register – from 158,752 in January 2007 to a peak of 470,284 in July 2011
(DEASP, 2019, p. 12) – in the context of a growing fiscal deficit. It was predominantly aimed at
reducing welfare caseloads via the shortest route possible, rather than addressing social
exclusion or enabling a right to sustainable employment in decent work. In this, the reforms
had some success although significant cohorts were also left behind by the policy emphasis
on activation via job-search conditionality. One notable aspect was the dominance of a male
breadwinner-shaped activation. As Figure 1 shows, the number of women on the Live
Register for one year or more was higher in February 2020 (27,604) than in October 2009
(23,399) – the earliest point that data on duration of registration are available –while the total
number of long-term claimants declined only marginally: from 87,414 claimants in October
2009 to 66,871 claimants in February 2020. These data suggest that Ireland’s activation
reforms had far less success in tackling enduring labour market exclusion than they had in
resolving acute, crisis-unemployment among men.
Compared with other EU countries, rates of employment among disadvantaged social
groups such as people with disability and lone parents remain very low in Ireland. In the case
of lone parents, although the employment rate increased from 46% in 2012 to 58% in 2017,
Source(s): Data extracted from Central Statistics Office database, data series LRM11: Persons on


















this remained among the lowest lone parent employment rates out of all EU-15 countries
(SVP, 2019). It was also accompanied by a sharp increase in rates of in-work poverty among
lone parents, from below 9% in 2012 to almost 21% in 2017 (SVP, 2019, p. 28), suggesting that
activation reforms pushed many lone parents into in-work poverty. Millar and Crosse (2018)
argue that activation is no panacea for poverty among lone parent households in Ireland,
especially given the high costs of child-care which is predominantly delivered via market
providers. One study, drawing on a survey of almost 3,700 affected claimants, found that
althoughmore lone parents transitioned to full-time employment as a result of changes to the
OPFP payment, almost half “saw a drop in their income and rates of deprivation were above
80%” (INDECON, 2017; cited in SVP, 2019, p. 12).
The reality of activation pushing parents into in-work poverty mirrors wider international
research, with two recent longitudinal studies of UK claimants’ experiences of activation and
conditionality (the Welfare Conditionality and Lived Experience studies) finding that the
transition from out-of-work to in-work poverty was a common experience among participants
in both studies (Wright and Patrick, 2019). As Seikel and Spannagel argue in a study of the
intersection between activation reforms and in-work poverty in Europe, “creating more jobs
does not automatically lead to less in-work poverty, as hoped for by policy-makers” (2018,
p. 257). While workfare style programmes can be effective for “those who are relatively job-
ready”, continuous doubts remain about the quality of employmentwithMartin observing in a
review of OECD policies that many are “activated to take low-wage jobs. . .which may not lift
them and their families permanently out of poverty” (2015, p. 22).More generally, international
evidence on the effectiveness of workfare policies is mixed. In a meta-analysis of over 200
evaluations of ALMPs, Card and colleagues conclude that workfare programs tend to have
large short-term effects for cohorts with few barriers other than unemployment. However,
effects are more marginal for women and the long-term unemployed (Card et al., 2015, p. 24).
Activation – for what?
These observations about the uneven impacts of workfare and potential for transitions into
in-work poverty bring into view long-standing concerns about the relationship between
workfare and the wider political economy. Critics accuse workfarist policies of being
regulatory strategies for “pimping the precariat” (Dean, 2012) that are concerned less with
“creating jobs for people who do not have them” than “creating workers for jobs that nobody
wants” (Peck, 2001, p. 6). This arises from how workfare redraws the boundaries between
work and welfare to press claimants into joining what critical political economists, following
Marx, term “the reserve army of labour” (Greer, 2016, p. 163). This reserve army constitutes a
readily available supply of labour for employers in expanding areas of the economy, creating
competition for jobs and enabling the cost of labour to remain low even in times of growth and
prosperity. Workfare polices are argued to reinforce this mechanism by “ratchet[ing]-up”
(Greer, 2016, p. 169) job competition and generally “resetting the terms for what constitutes
acceptable work” (Brodkin and Larsen, 2013, p. 58). Standing identifies a “vicious circle” in
which labour market flexibility leads to a proliferation of insecure jobs providing few
incentives for claimants to enter employment. This then leads governments to tighten
eligibility conditions and cut payments “to ‘make work pay’” which, in turn, further erodes
wages (Standing, 2011, p. 36). Peck and Theodore describe “a dialectical relationship”
between workfare policies and the flexible labour markets in which they operate: where the
former “exploit the conditions found in contingent job markets” to move people into work
while simultaneously reproducing precarity through securing a “labour supply for insecure
work” (2000, p. 123).
The trajectory of Ireland’s recovery from the Great Recession illustrates this kind of




2012–2018 shows that while employment grew by 382,000 jobs over this period, more than
40% of this growth was concentrated in sectors “with above average risk of
precariousness” (Nugent et al., 2019, p. 8) in terms of work uncertainty, low pay and
limited entitlements. This risk of precarity is exacerbated by the extent of reliance on
market provision to meet housing, child-care and other essential needs. This gives rise to
flex-insecurity that leaves no cushion for those suddenly unemployed. Poor investment in
public services marks Ireland out from other countries that pursued the same activation
policies but have had better underlying architecture to enable the state to meet essential
needs. Ireland’s relatively early and restrictive response to the pandemic might be
explained by a lack of choice in the absence of decent public services (schools, health,
transport and above all child, elder and social care). Real per capita expenditure on public
services is low (V7,200 compared to EU peer group average of V8,400). The German state,
while implementing Hartz IV workfare-oriented reforms, still spends V8,400 per capita on
public services while the Danish state pursues flexicurity with public services expenditure
of V10,100 per capita (OECD, 2016). Spending on public services needs to rise by 21% or
close to V9 billion to reach Ireland’s EU peer group average. In this context, income
support-based policy responses like PUP become a likely emergency response for
households displaced from employment but heavily reliant on market-based services for
basic needs (Murphy, 2017).
The micro-mechanisms or microeconomics of labour market participation post-2008
work through a combination of weak employment protection regulation and tighter and
recommodified income support rules: the intersection of these micro-mechanisms pushes
or compels unemployed people into lower paid work. The numbers of Irish workers
working variable part-time hours almost doubled between 2007 and 2014, before slightly
declining in 2016, while the overall incidence of temporary workers rose from 8% in 2008
to 10% in 2013 (Muprhy, 2017). Nugent et al.’s analysis of employment growth and
temporary work finds an increasing proportion of temporary contracts of less than one
year in duration, from about 60% of temporary contracts in 2007 to over 63% of temporary
contracts by late 2018. More worryingly, the incidence of involuntary” temporary workers
– people on temporary contracts because they have been unable to find permanent work –
almost tripled from 14.1% of temporary workers in 2008 to over 39% in 2017 (Nugent
et al., 2019).
Low-paid work also rose substantially, with approximately 23% of Irish workers
estimated to be low-paid – defined as wages below two-thirds of median income – in 2017 (Ni
Aodha, 2019) compared with 20% in 2010 (Logue and Callan, 2016). In conjunction with the
rise in low-paid work, there has been a 20% increase in the numbers of workers experiencing
in-work poverty: from 91,407 in 2009 to almost 110,000 in 2018 (SJI, 2020). Women, lone
parents and younger workers are over-represented among the ranks of the low-paid. Over
60% of low-paid workers in 2013 were female, while 36% were under 30 – double the
proportion of younger workers than in employment as a whole (Collins and Murphy, 2016).
Sectorally, low-paid workers are concentrated in Wholesale and Retail trade (23.8%) and in
Accommodation and Food Services (18.1%), with O’Sullivan et al. (2017, p. 14) attributing the
growth of low-paid work in these sectors partly to “[s]tate policy on employer’s social
insurance” and discounted contribution rates paid in respect to low-waged workers. The
concentration of low-paid work in these sectors is particularly significant given they
constitute a greater proportion of indigenous employment in Ireland than other EU countries
(O’Sullivan et al., 2017). They have also been the sectors most impacted by Covid-19, with
pandemic unemployment tracking underlying fault-lines of precarity, low pay and inequality
in the Irish labourmarket. In so doing, it has exposed the shallowness of the foundations upon
which Ireland’s recovery from recession was built, and the fragility of an activation model





While individual state responses to Covid-19 reflect a variety of dynamics, including the
power of interest group politics, political institutions, underlying values and states’ position
in the global economy, we have focused here on how social architecture and past reform
trajectories can shape the range of policy responses to the pandemic and impact on welfare
states and citizens. It might be argued that retrenchment and activation reforms following the
last crisis have left countries such as Ireland with greater fiscal capacity to address the
macroeconomic and unemployment challenges of the Covid-crisis. Entering the pandemic,
Ireland’s debt-to-GDP ratio was below the EU average, enabling the country to borrow at low
interest rates to fund emergency welfare measures (Parliamentary Budget Office, 2020).
However, the pursuit of austerity also left Ireland with under-funded public services and an
increased reliance on market provision to meet housing and other essential needs. This
weakened institutional capacity to adopt more flexible lockdown measures while
necessitating emergency income supports to be set at high rates to enable citizens to
continue to meet housing and other essential needs.
Our analysis of the impact of Covid-19 on Ireland’s welfare state raises new questions
about the direction of future welfare reform and the role of activation regimes in shaping
policy responses. The levels of unemployment reached during the present crisis will become a
challenge for the future of the Irish welfare state. As the pandemic transitions from a public
health to an unemployment crisis, the necessity of active labour policy will come increasingly
into view. We are witnessing a similar accumulation of conditions – a sharp increase in
claimant numbers at a time of deepening recession – to those confronting countries in the
wake of the financial crisis. The trajectory of activation labour policy reform following that
crisis was underscored by a deepening commitment to labour commodification via benefit
cuts, job-search conditionality and mandatory participation in low-cost activation
programmes. The welfare reforms that have unfolded since 2010 are characteristic of this
“low road” model, although Ireland is just one among several European countries that
reconfigured their activation regimes in this direction following the Great Recession.
While the Covid crisis has temporarily disrupted the spread of workfare activation due to
countries’momentarily enhancing the compensatory and enabling elements of welfare while
suspendingwelfare’smore demanding side, there is every reason to believe that countrieswill
recommit themselves to workfare policies as attention shifts to reducing claimant numbers.
Further analysis would be useful to examine experiences beyond European and liberal
regimes (for example, in South America and Asian countries). However, the seeds of this shift
are already being sown in Ireland by the foreshadowing of cuts to the PUP, tightening of
eligibility conditions and policy attention on redesigning payments to incentivise ‘work at the
margin, noting that the most severely impacted sectors have many workers on relatively low
wages’ (LMAC, 2020, p. 13). At the time of writing, the Irish government is proposing a Social
Welfare (Covid-19) Amendment Bill that will legislate a requirement for PUP claimants to
actively job-search, paving the way for claimants to be subject to benefit conditionality and
sanctions. However, aswe have argued, this approach to active labour policy reformpriorities
low-hanging fruit: moving the recently unemployed back into work at speed while doing little
to address the labour market exclusion experienced by more disadvantaged citizens. There
are also considerable social costs in terms of how workfare policies intersect with the
regulation of contingent labour markets to grow low-paid economies and in-work poverty. In
Ireland, this has been powerfully exposed by the magnitude and unequal impacts of
pandemic unemployment on different groups of workers, with Covid-related job
displacement tracking the contours of employment precarity in the Irish labour market.
Prior to Covid, therewas an increasing recognition of the need for a further reorientation of
activation policy to support the labour market inclusion of the longer-term unemployed and




Government’s Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection elaborated in
evidence to a parliamentary committee, the primary focus of activation post-recession was to
help those “on the live register to compete for such job vacancies as arise and reduce their
individual duration of unemployment.” But with the country moving into a period of relative
prosperity that focus could shift to what he termed “active inclusion”: “increasing active
labour-market participation by all people of a working age. . . to offer greater support to
people from non-jobseeker cohorts” (JCEASP, 2018, p. 6). Developing this idea, the Oireachtas
Committee on Employment Affairs and Social Protection called for “active inclusion” to
become central to future labour market policy development and for the government “to move
away from its current work-first approach” (JCEASP, 2018, p. 32) towards a more rights-
based, “person-centred” approach. But although activation policies are often advocated as
promoting social inclusion, the two are not always complimentary. As Perkins argues, rather
than supporting inclusion, activation can “contribute to further exclusion” depending on how
policies intersect with “the broader labour market context, and the extent to which this
supports the creation of jobs with good wages and conditions at the lower end of the labour
market” (2010, p. 281). Having highlighted the continuity between the reform to welfare
provision post the Great Recession, and the fragility of the welfare state today to deal with a
major pandemic, the question now is whether this will extend into future welfare architecture.
The danger post-Covid is that momentum for a more inclusive approach to active labour
policy development will be halted by a refocusing on activating the pandemically
unemployed.
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